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STRATEGIC INVESTMENT IN A DEBT BARGAINING FRAMEWORX
ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes the strategic role of investment from a debtor
country's perspective.The framework is one in which, if the debtor
country is unable to meet debt obligations, a bargaining regime determines
the amount of debt repayment.In the context of a two-country real trade
model, debt repayment is equal to the trade surplus of the debtor.The
outcome of the bargaining game will therefore be dependent (among other
things) on the level of production in the debtor country.In this
framework, the paper shows that productive investment may increase or
decrease the bargaining power of the debtor country.This ambiguity
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Washington, D.C. 20431I.Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the strategic role of
investment in a debt situation that includes the possiblity of default
and establishnent of a bargaining regime in which debtor and creditor
negotiate the anount of repayment.The recent literature has
developed the notion of the debt overhang, which argues that old debt
works as a tax on new investment.This effect follows from the
assumption that creditors obtain a share in the proceeds from new
investment, and this acts as an effective tax on new investment.This
paper describes an environment in which, due to strategic
considerations, the debt overhang generates ambiguous incentives over
investment.In particular, we identify a case in which investnient
helps the debtor country to obtain a better outcome in the bargaining
process.In this case, the debt overhang acts as a subsidy to
investment.
The possibility of default by the debtor country introduces two
separate effects.The first is the standard credit rationing effect.
This means that the debtor country faces an upward—sloping credit
supply and an overall ceiling on foreign debt, with the consequent
increase in the domestic real interest rate and decrease in productive
investment.Note that this effect is independent from and additional
to the "debt tax" argument suggested by the debt overhang literature.
The second is the strategic effect of partial defaults: the effect of
an increase in investment on the outcome of the bargaining game for
the debtor.The sign and magnitude of this effect depends on thecharacteristics of the bargaining game.
This paper shows that productive investment may eitherimprove or
worsen the bargaining outcome for the debtor,which implies that the
debt overhang does not necessarily act as a tax oninvestment in this
sense.To analyze the role of strategic investment, westart by
describing the supply of credit facing the debtor in this context.
The credit supply schedule incorporates thepossibility of a
bargaining regime, either as a random future event or as thecurrent
regime.Because the outcome of the bargaining process isdetennined
(aniong other factors) by the capital stock of the debtor economythe
supply schedule shifts with changes in investment in the debtor
economy. j/
When choosing its optimal capital accumulation, thedebtor
country considers the effects on the foreign debtsituation.The
debtor must weigh two effects: a direct effect on the amountof
repayment (the outcome of the bargaining game), and an indirecteffect
on the cost of borrowing (the response ofthe credit supply function).
The paper shows that the direct repayment effect alwaysdominates.
The reason is that a reduction in the cost of creditbenefits the
country only in the good states of nature, when the countrychooses
not to default, while a better bargaining outcome benefits thecountry
in the bad states of nature, when it prefers to default onforeign
/Ina multiple-sector economy, the composition ofthe capital stock
becomes critical.The foreign debt repercussions of investment allocation
between sectors have been studied by Aizenman (1988), orenszteinand Ghosh
(1989) and Diwan (1988).
2debt payments.Because the niarginal utility of consumption and the
marginal value of traded inputs are both higher in the bad states of
nature, gains obtained in the bargaining regime are more valuable than
gains obtained in the nondefault regime.
The change in the bargaining outcome as a response to investment
in the debtor country is not uniquely determined and depends on the
particular structure of international trade.Our basic framework is
one in which trade takes place on primary productive inputs, while the
final good (used for both consumption and investment) is non—tradable.
International trade benefits are thus obtained from input
diversification.In this context, the effect of investment depends on
the substitutability between capital and traded inputs in the
production function of the debtor country.If the elasticity of
substitution of capital with traded inputs exceeds (falls short of)
unity, an increase in investment increases (reduces) the repayntent to
the creditor.We confirm the robustness of this general result by
analyzing an alternative international trade framework, which is a
simplified two-country two—good trade model.In this case, the effect
of investment on debt repayments depends on the specification of the
utility functions and it may also be either positive or negative.
II.The Supply of Credit
We will initially assume that in the first period a free—trade
regime exists because debt is not large enough for the debtors to
3default in its service and enter the bargaining situation.However,
there is uncertainty concerning the second period, and there is some
probability of default.If the debtor country can expect a better
outcome by entering the bargaining game than by fully servicing its
debt, it will default on its debt.For simplicity, we will assume
that the only source of uncertainty is a random shock to the supply of
the debtor country's primary input.There are two possible states of
nature: a high-output state (positive supply shock) and a low-output
state (negative supply shock).These states are indexed by (H,L).
Therefore, the supply of the debtor's primary product can take two
values: and
Let R denote the total payoff on foreign debt obtained by the
creditor country in the second period.In this two—country world, R
is equal to the trade deficit run by the creditor country when trade
flows are valuated at the free—trade prices.In the bargaining
regime, two payoffs are possible according to the prevailing state of
nature, which verify:
(1)RH>
becausesome of the extra output available in the high—output state
will be received as debt repayment by the creditor.Though plausible,
the above statement is not self—evident; however, it can be easily
proved for the bargaining model described in the next section, which
is done in the Appendix.
4We will assume that the creditor country behaves according to a
naxinnnn expected value rule.This inplies that the creditor's supply
curve will satisfy the following condition:
(2)(1+r)B E(R)
where r is the risk—free interest rate.Note that R depends on the
regine prevailing in the second period, that is, on whether there will
be full repayment of debt or a bargaining outcone.Moreover, if the
bargaining regine prevails, R will be dependent on the state of
nature.Therefore, R can take three values: (1+r)B,RH, and RL,
according to the regine at the tine of repayment and to the state of
nature, where r represents the contractual interest rate charged on
loans.
For given values of the state variables (the capital stocks in
the debtor and creditor countries), the debt level niay fall in three
different regions giving rise to three different segments in the
credit supply function:a horizontal segment, an upward—sloping
segnent, and a vertical segment.For very low values of debt, the
debtor will prefer full payment to entering a bargaining situation.
Let B denote the naximum debt level for which the debtor will choose
not to bargain (in either state of nature) and will repay debts in
full.That is, B will be given by:
(3)(1+r)B=RL
5This means that at some low levels of debt it is cheaper for the
debtor to meet its obligation in full than to enter the bargaining
process, irrespective of the state of nature.Because the debtor
would never choose to default, the risk—free interest rater will be
charged for any debt level lower than or equal to B.
In this framework, there is always a maximum amount of debt that
creditors are willing to hold.The existence of this upper bound
follows from the fact that there is a maximum payoff that can be
obtained in the bargaining process(RH) anda larger loan will not
increase that maximum payoff, irrespective of the contractual interest
rate being charged.Assuming the high-output state and the low-output
state both have the same probability of occurence, the maximum value
of debt, which we denote B, is obtained from:
(4)B(1+r)=.S(RL+RH)
Any increase in B beyond B does not increase the expected payoff;
moreover, for any value of B higher than B the creditors will obtain
an expected return lower than the risk—free interest rate,
independently of the contractual interest rate.
For loans larger than B but smaller than B, we are in a situation
in which the debtor would default and enter the bargaining equilibrium
if the bad state occurs, but would repay in full in the good state.In
this range, the supply curve will satisfy:
6B(1+r)=.5(B(1+r)+RL),or
(5)1+r=2(1+r)—RL/B, B CBCB
It is apparent that in this region r is a positive function of B.
Therefore, the shape of the supply curve will be as shown in Figure 1.
We can also obtain the maximum contractual interest rate, r that will





Note that the position of the supply curve is a function of the
second-period output in the debtor country, that is, of its capital
stock and endowment shock.Being aware of that fact, the debtor
country will adjust its investment strategy to take account of the
repercussions on the credit supply function.Before turning to the
debtor's decision, let us examine the changes in the supply function
induced by investment in the debtor country.A change in the capital
stock will affect all B, B, and r(B) as follows:
dB — 1dR
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Itis apparent that the direction of the shift in the supply
curve is determined by the signs of how the payoffs are affected for
creditors and debtors.As we showed in the bargaining equilibriunt,
two cases are possible. In the first, an increase in the capital stock
of the debtor country increases the payoff for the creditor in both
states of nature, which shifts the supply curve outwards.In the
second case, an increase in the capital stock of the debtor country
reduces the payoff for the creditor in both states of nature, which
shifts the supply curve inwards.
Notice that so far we have assunted that there is no outstanding
debt at the beginning of the first period.However, this is a
generalization that can be niade without much effort.Let B0 be the
previous outstanding debt and R0 be the repayment in the first period,
itself the outcome of bargaining between debtor and creditor.Then




The supply schedule for this case is obtained simply by
substituting B +B0-R0in equation (5) for B.The financial
8operation in this case involves rolling over debt for an amount equal
to and issuing new loans for an amount equal to B.The
situation is depicted in Figure 2.We basically have the same supply
curve as in Figure 1, but with a rightward shiftin the origin of B0 -
R0.The effect of the debt overhang is that the country starts with a
new debt of B - andconsequently the supply of new credit B is
reduced from SS to S0S.But all the previous qualitative results are
still valid.In particular, investment in the debtor country will
still shift the supply curve in the ways described above.
III.The Bargaining Equilibrium
If the debtor country decides to completely default on its debts,
it will suffer economic sanctions that would involve some disruption
of its international trade.An extreme case is when trade is made
completely impossible, and the debtor country niust live under autarky
conditions.This situation would clearly be an inferior one: debtors
lose all gains from international trade, and creditors can collect
none of the outstanding debt.Therefore, there exists a possibility
of engaging in some form of international trade which would be
niutually advantageous.Such arrangement would be one in which
creditors receive some debt repayittent, and the debtor country is
allowed to enter international trade under some conditions.The
bargaining equilibrium developed in this section describes the outconieof negotiations between the debtor and creditor under these
circumstances.
The trade model that we use essentially follows Ethier's (1982)
framework.The two countries have an endowment of a primary product,
which is internationally tradable, and which, together with capital
(we exclude labor for simplicity), is used to produce the final,
nontradable product.The primary product of the debtor country is
denoted as X, and the primary product of the creditor country is
denoted as Y.The quantitites of the two primary products used in
production will be denoted as X and for the debtor country and as
X and Y for the creditor country.Thus, we have:
* * — (10)X+Y=X
(11)X+Y=Y
For the purposes of this section we will assume a unit
(exogenous) supply of each primary good: X=Y=1.The
quantities of the final good produced in each country will be denoted
by Z and Z.These are given by the following production functions:




where —< a,fl < 1.
10In this context, gains from trade are derived from increasing
returns in production generated by input diversity.iJTo gain in
clarity, we are assuming that only the debtor country obtains gains
from trade.Therefore, although a purely free trade equilibrium will
not generate any productivity benefit for the creditor country, the
bargaining equilibrium brings about some debt repayment and is
therefore beneficial for the creditor economy.Note that, in a
free—trade regime, the creditor country may obtain intertemporal gains
from trade, derived from the ability to lend to or to carry out direct
investment in the developing country.
In the present context, both countries can abandon all
negotiations and produce and consume at their autarky levels.These
are the "threat points" of debtor and creditor;therefore, any
bargaining equilibrium must satisfy the constraint of being preferred
to the autarky position by both parties.We will apply the syuinetric
Nash bargaining equilibrium framework (see Roth (1979), Binmore (1987,
etc).This bargaining equilibrium can be obtained by finding the
Pareto—optimal allocation that maximizes the product of gains from
trade, that is, of moving from autarky to a Nash bargaining
equilibrium.Letting ZN denote the level of production under the Nash
equilibrium, and ZA denote the level of production under autarky, the
bargaining equilibrium is the solution to the following problem.
1/In the case of several productive sectors, the value of ,which
represents the elasticity of substitution between the different productive
inputs plays a key role to distinguish opposing effects of investment on
the bargaining outcome.
11(14)Max (Z —Z)(ZN —ZA)
This framework assumes perfect contemporaneous information for
both parties. /Anotherfull information framework that has been
applied to the debt problem is one in which the two parties make a
sequence of offers and counteroffers, while time spent in the process
is costly because of time discounting and depreciation of the
underlying product, such as in O'Connell (1987) and Bulow and Rogoff
(1988).The existence of a "perfect equilibrium" in the latter type
of game has been shown by Rubinstein (1979).Although the Nash
equilibrium is a static game, in which the demands from both parties
are made simultaneously, Binmore (1987) has showed that the perfect
equilibria approximate the Nash bargaining solution when the interval
between demands is short.If the time discount rates of the two
parties differ, the perfect equilibria approximate an asymmetric Nash
bargaining equilibrium.
The symmetry in the production function implies that both inputs
will always be used in equal quantities for the debtor country in both
the free—trade and the bargaining regimes.In a free trade regime the
relative price of the two inputs will be unity, because they are
/SeeRotemberg (1988) for a foreign debt bargaining model with imperfect
information.





where a indicates the bargaining power.The objective function (14) is
equivalent to the above one with a —1/2.
12perfect substitutes in the creditor country production function, and
this ensures that they are demanded in equal amounts by the debtor
country.In the bargaining regime, because the equilibrium satisfies
Pareto optimality two primary inputs must also be used in equal
amounts by the debtor country.This implies f= Also,because









Therefore,the global resource allocation is entirely determined
by X, and we can treat the bargaining process as simply the selection
of the value of in order to:







The first-order condition for this maximization is:




13We are interested in the sign ofdX*/dK*,because that derivative
will deterittine investment decisions prior to the negotiation process.
IfdX*/dK* is negative, investment has the negative (for the debtor)
side effect of increasing debt repayments, which reduces incentives to
invest.We can identify this situation with the 'debt overhang"
prob1em./ Bycontra*st,*if dX/dKis positive, investment helps the
debtor country to obtain a more favorable outcome from the bargaining,
and the existence of large or nonserviceable debt has in fact a
positive incentive effect for investment and production.In the
Appendix, we show that the sign ofdX*/dK* isequal to minus the sign
Of a.Note that the elasticity of substitution between capital and
primary inputs is equal to i/(1—a).Therefore,dX*/dK* is positive
when the elasticity of substitution is less than one, zero when the
elasticity of substitution is equal to one, and negative when the
elasticity of substitution is greater than one.
To gain further insight into this result let us denote byTG(X*)
andTG*(X*)the gains from trade relative to autarky (in percentage






)JSeeDooley (1986), Froot (1988), Krugman (1988), Sachs (1987).
14Therefore, we can represent the condition defining the bargaining
outcome (16) by the requirement that:
(19)TG*I(X*)/TG*(X*)= —TG,(X*)/TG(X*)
The right—hand side measures the percentage decrease in the
creditor's gains from trade that is associated with a marginal
increase of X, and is described by schedule CC in Figure 3.The
left-hand side measures the percentage gain in the debtor's gains from
trade associated with a marginal increase in X, and is described by
schedule DD.The intersection of both schedules gives the bargaining
*
outcome.At this allocation a marginal change of X will cause
percentage losses of the gains from trade to one party that equal the
percentage gains to the other party.Note that investment by the
debtor will affect the DD schedule, and the resultant bargaining
equilibrium.
To trace the consequences of the investment on the DD schedule
one should evaluate both the change in the marginal and the average
gains from trade i.e., theTG*F (X*) andtheTG*(X*), respectively.
Direct derivation reveals that investment will reduce (increase) the
marginal gains from trade(TG*, (X*)) if the elasticity of substitution
between capital and the aggregate inputs exceeds (falls short of)
unity, and will stay intact if the elasticity equals unity.It turns
out that these factors dominate the behavior of the DD curve, which
will shift downward (upward) for the elastic (inelastic) case.The
unitary elasticity case is the borderline case, where the (percentage)
15gains from trade are independent from the aggregate capital stock, due
to the multiplicative nature in which capital enters the production
process.
Figure 3 is also useful to highlight the role of stochastic
endowments.Note that a rise in the total endowment of the debtor
will have the consequence of widening the bargaining region, and
shifting curve CC horizontally by the increase in endowment to C'C'.
The bargaining outcome will increase by less than the endowment
increase, making both the debtor and the creditors better of f.
IV.The Debtor's Problem
The debtor country faces the problem of choosing consumption and
investment in a forward-looking way.In addition to standard
optimality considerations, the debtor country will choose the level of
investment that positions it advantageously for the bargaining game
(if it were to take place.)Recall that we work with a two—period
framework, where in the first period a free—trade regime prevails, but
in the second either the free—trade or the bargaining regime may
prevail.
As discussed in the bargaining section, in equilibrium the debtor
uses the two intermediate goods in equal amounts.Let V indicate the
composite of the intermediate goods X and Yusedby the debtor
country.Let denote the supply of primary input X in state S, for
16S =H,L.The world supply of intermediate goods is then given by
(1,1) in the first period, and by(XS1) in the second.Then, it can
be seen that in a free trade regine, V will be given by:
(20) X—(1+r)B
In the bargaining regime, V will be given by:
B — — — * *
(21)V=X—R=X—(X-2X)=2X
where X' is the amount of input X obtained by the debtor in the
bargaining equilibrium.The repayment to the creditor is defined (in
terms of the primary good composite) as the difference between the
debtor's endowmentand what it keeps when the bargaining equilibrium
is reached (2X*).
Using the composite V together with capitalK*to produce output
Z, the debtor deterniines its consumption and investment decisions on





j/Recall that at the free-trade price of the two Inputs is unity and the
debtor country always uses the two inputs in equal quantities.
17where C stands for consumption, I for investment and Z for production
of the final good. and V0 are the exogenously given initial stocks
of capital and of the intermediate good composite, B is the level of
borrowing carried out in the first period, R is the repayment obtained
by the creditor country in the bargaining regime.International debt
B is denominated in units of the traded goods (that is, inputs).In
the more general case of a starting debt overhang, B —(B0—R0)takes
the place of B in the above system.In this two—period framework, we
abstract from time preference in the utility function without loss of
generality.
Given the shape of the credit supply function, there are three
different situations that may arise.In the first case, B C B, and
the country can borrow as much as it wants at the fixed risk—free
interest rate.In this situation, we can rewrite the problem as:
maxu[z(K;v0÷B)—I)+.5u[Z(K*, H_B(l+rf))J+







A2 Zv(K,Vo + B) —
A2
whereA2=u'(c1), and A2= E(u'(c2)).
18The first—order necessary conditions are the standard ones in
stochastic nodels of intertenporal consunption.They equalize the
covariances with the narginal utility of consunption of the returns on
thedifferent assets.Equation (23) applies this condition to
donestic capital and the equation (24) applies it to foreign debt.
Note that debt is denondnated in traded input units and therefore the
rate of change in its inplicit relative price with consunption good is
part of its return.
In the second regime, the upward—sloping section of the supply
curve, the country will default in the bad state and repay in the good
state.We can rewrite the problen as:
naxu[z(K,v0+B)—I)+.5u[Z(K',H_B[1+r(B,K*)JJ+.5u[Z(K*,X1_R1))
which yields the first order conditions:
E(ul(c2)ZK*J A2 *—LLdRL
(25)——— = + ————fl— Z,(K,X -R )——;
2 2 A2+A2 dK
H
A2 *—H d(1+r — Zv(K,X -B(1+r)) B
dK
drZv(K1HB(l+))
(26) (1 +r+Ba— =
A2 +A2 Zv(Ko,Vo+B) A2
whereA= u'(c), 4= u'(ct), and A2=.5(A +4)Makinguse of






Condition (27) equates the expected marginal product of capital
(measured in utility terns) with the sum of the benchnark donestic
interestrate (A1/A2)and the expected strategiceffect of investnent.
The strategic effect of investhent is given by the change in
repayment in the bargaining regine(dR7dK*) weightedby the tenti A,
which iieasures the loss derived front a marginal increase in repayment
in the bad state, and is defined by the difference between two terns.
The first tern is the effect of the change in the availability of
traded inputs in the bargaining regine (neasured in utility units),
and the second is the change in the availability of traded inputs in
the free-trade regime as a consequence of the shift in the supply
curve.Notice that A is always positive because both the marginal
utility of consunption and the marginal product of inputs are higher
in the lower output state.Therefore, the effect of investnent on the
repayment in the bargaining regine is always the doninant one.
Conparing (27) to (23) it is easy to see that strategic
considerations affect the optinal value of the expected narginal
product of capital in two ways: the change in bargaining repayment and
the credit supply response.These two effects are always of opposite
sign because if the change in repayment favors the debtor it must hurt
20the creditor, which prompts a credit supply response that increases
the cost of borrowing.But, as we have shown A to be positive, the
direct repayment effect always dominates the indirect credit supply
response.
Therefore, the strategic effect of investment depends on the
change induced in bargaining power.If investment decreases the
bargaining power of the debtor by increasing the debt repayment
(dR7dK*>O), the strategic effect will reduce investnient (because it
implies that a higher marginal product of capital is optimal.)This
is true despite the fact that the debtor country could improve its
borrowing conditions by increasing investment spending because the
repayment effect is more powerful.This situation matches the
description of debt overhang niodels, in which past accumulated debts
act as a tax on new investment.By contrast, when investment
increases the bargaining power of the debtor(dR/dK*<O),new
investments generate a positive externality on the debt situation of
the country, and the strategic incentives will work toward an increase
in investment spending.In this case, paradoxically, an increase in
investment spending by the debtor makes creditors less willing to lend
by increasing the risk of default. /
Oneshould be cautious, however, in deriving conclusions from the
strategic positive incentive case.In particular, it does not ixnply
that investment will be higher than in a case of absence of foreign
1/Notice,however, that increases in the cost of borrowing by themselves do
affect negatively the amount of foreign debt the country would like to have
(see equation (26).)
21debt (or more precisely of absence of constraints on foreign
borrowing).This is because the fact that the debtor country faces an
upward-sloping credit supply function implies that the benchmark
domestic interest rate (1/A2)willbe higher than in the case of no
constraints on foreign borrowing, and investment is correspondingly
lower.In our framework the absence of constraints on foreign debt
exist at low levels of indebtedness, when there is no immediate risk
of default (B <B.)
In the third possible case, the country has run up against the
maximun amount of borrowing it can get, B.At that point, a
bargaining regime will take place for sure in the second period.The
problem can then be formulated as:
maxu{Z(K,V0+B)—I)+.5u{Z(K,XH_R1))+.5u[Z(K*,X_R1)J
The first order condition for investment is:
E(u' (c2)ZK*) i ( * —ss dRS
(28)————————= + —i— E1A2 ZV(K,X —R )——;
2 2 2' dK
Again, strategic considerations affect the investment decision.
Thebargaining regime implies that investment is "taxed" if the
repayment increases with the stock of capital in the debtor country,
but it is "subsidizedt' in the opposite case.Note that, in this
second case, the existence of a large stock of previous debt implies
that the country will be credit rationed, and the benchmark domestic
22interest rate (A1/A2)willbe much higher, which by itself depresses
investment.
V.An Alternative Bargaining Equilibrium
In the bargaining model of Section II, the effect of a larger
capital stock on the payoff for the debtor depended on the elasticity
of substitution in production, in the context of a diversified input
trade model. However, the indeterminacy of the effect of higher
capital (or output) on the bargaining payoff appears to be fairly
robust. In this section we provide another example in which trade
takes place in final goods (there are no primary inputs) and the sane
indeterminacy holds.
We assume that there are two final goods in the world economy:
good D produced by the debtor country, and good F, produced by the
creditor country. The two goods are perfect substitutes for the
creditor country, while the debtor country has a preference for good
F. More precisely, the utility function of the debtor countryis
given by:
(29)u=u(D+aF)
where a>1,andthe utility function of the creditor country is given
by:
23(30)V= v(D+F)
The above utility functions imply that in a free-trade regime the
relative price of the two goods is unity and the debtor country
exports all of its output (we will assume throughout that F >D)The
asynmetric framework implies that only the debtor country obtains
gains from trade.But the creditor country needs to engage in
international trade in order to extract any debt payments from the
debtor country.The only way for the debtor country to make debt
repayments is to run a trade surplus. jJ
Bydefinition, debt repayments are equal to the trade surplus of
the debtor economy.Denoting debt repayments by R:
(31)R =D—FE
where FE represents exports of the good F.Equivalently, we can
assume that in the bargaining regime the two sides negotiate over
terTns of trade x, such that:
(32)xD=FE
where one unit of the D good is exchanged for x units of the F good.
A value of x less than one implies that positive debt repayments are
JNotethat although the creditor country does not obtain static gains
from trade, it may obtain intertemporal gains from trade by being able to
decouple domestic savings and investment.But we abstract from this latter
effect in this analysis.
24taking place.The bargaining equilibrium will consist in obtaining
the value of x that represents the outcome of the symmetric power
negotiations between debtors and creditors.
The equilibrium value of x has to satisfy two restrictions.
First, x must be less than one, because the creditor will never accept
an offer that involves a value of x1, since such a value of x
implies a net transfer to the debtor and the creditor would be better
off simply by breaking off negotiations.That is, x =1is the
creditor's "threat point".And second, x must be larger than 1/
because otherwise the debtor country would be better of f by breaking
of f negotiations and consuniing its own output in autarky.Therefore,
the debtor's threat point is x =1/a.
With x lying in the above range, creditors buy as much of the D
good as they can get, and debtors buy as much F good as they can
afford.Therefore, since we assume that F >D>xD,in the bargaining
equilibrium, the creditor country consumes all the output of good D
and part of the output of good F.Thus, the consumption bundle (D,F)
obtained by the debtor country is given by (O,xD), and the consumption
bundle obtained by the creditor country is given by (D,F—xD).
The Nash bargaining equilibrium for this game can be obtained by
solving the following maxiniization problem:
Max[u(D,F) _uA(D,F))[v(D,F) _vA(D,F))
s.t. 1/c<X<1
25whereuA(.,.) and vA(.,.) indicate the utility functions at the
autarky consumption bundles.The first—order necessary condition is:
(33)u(v -VA) -V(U -uA)
for x in the specified range.In light of the above description of
the trades that take place in the bargaining regime and of (29) and
(30), we can be more specific about the utility functions:
U=u(axD) ;u u(D)
v=v((1-x)D+F);vA=v(F)
We are interested in examining how the bargaining outcome is
affected by a change in the endownient of the debtor country, that is,
in the sign of dx/dD.This is the relevant relation for investment
incentives.If dx/dD is negative, a larger output in the debtor
country increases the share of it going to the creditor in the
bargaining outcome.In this case, we are in the presence of a "debt
overhang" situation in which incentives to investment by the debtor
country are reduced because of the larger transfer of resources to
creditors in the event that a bargaining situation should arise in the
future.By contrast, if dx/dD is positive, the total return to
investment for the debtor increases because of the positive effect of
larger output on the payoff obtained by the debtor in case of
bargaining.
26The sign of dx/dD cannot be determined a priori.Two
contradictory forces are present.One the one hand, a larger value of
D increases the threat point of the debtor, which is the minimum
payoff it could obtain, thus contributing to a more favorable outcome
for the debtor country.But on the other hand, if the increase in 0
implies that the marginal gain from a change in payoffs increases more
for the debtor than the creditor, the final outcome will be more
favorable to the creditors.
The precise expression for dx/dD is the following:
u(v.vA) +u v+uV+ V(u_uA)—vuA
dx xD xDDx xD xD
dD uxx(v_vA) + 2uxv+Vxx(u_uA)











27By using the abova relationships, it can be seen that the
denominator of (34) is always negative.The numerator of (34) is, in








Thesign of (35) depends on the specific form of the utility
function of the debtor and creditors.If both parties have
logarithmic utility functions, it can be shown that (35) is positive.
By contrast, when both parties have exponential utility functions,
nunerical sinulation suggests that the sign is always negative.For
exanple, using u =v=—e,nunerical solutions to the problen
generate the following results:
a D x dx/dD
2 1 0.74 —0.01
5 1 0.49 —0.07
2 3 0.74 —0.007
5 3 0.49 —0.02
28It is important to notice that, even when dx/dD is negative, the
debtor country is never worse off by having a larger supply of its
output.In other words, du/dD is always positive.j/Therefore, even
inthecase that an increase in the debtor country's output generates
anincreasein debt repayment, the latter increase is never large
enough to leave the debtor country in a less favorable position.This
fact is reassuring, because otherwise the debtor country could make
itself better off by destroying part of its output, and the bargaining
equilibrium would not be well characterized.
VI.Conclusions
Our examples lead us to conclude that the strategic consequences
of investment are rather involved and cannot be determined without
detailed knowledge of the economy.The possibility that an actual or
potential movement into a bargaining regime can either encourage or
discourage investment for strategic reasons appears to be quite
general.This result qualifies the arguments for a debt overhang
disincentive effect on investment.But, once again, it should be
stressed that the strategic effects are additional to the disincentive
to investment caused by an upward—sloping credit supply curve and
credit rationing.
j/Note that uax(1+x)and from (34) we get that1+x>O.
29Another important aspect of the problem, which we did not touch
in this paper, is the effect of the sectoral composition of
investment.In this case, investment has a predictable effect:
investirient that increases the weight of the sector that is more (less)
trade dependent will generate the strategic tax (subsidy) effect (see
Aizenman (1988)).This suggests that greater attention should be
given to the sectoral composition of investment in any attempt to link
the availability of new credit and investment.
An important policy implication of this paper is that one cannot
count on initiatives that reduce the burden of past debts to
automatically improve incentives for investment in indebted countries.
This may be the case for certain countries but does not necessarily
hold for all.More generally, one would expect that, for strategic
reasons, the debt overhang depresses certain types of investment and
encourages others.Although this situation would not be an optimal
resource allocation in a free trade, no risk of default regime, it may
still be the case that, for some countries, the depression of
investment is more closely related to a shortage of savings generated
by international credit constraints and low domestic savings.In this
case, for example, policies that encourage domestic savings would have
a much larger impact on domestic investment than a change in the
incentive structure arising from the debt overhang.
Our analysis suggests that the consequences of the debt overhang
for aggregate investment may be ambiguous in value.For example, a
rise in investment triggered by strategic considerations may in fact
30reflect an attempt by the debtor country to increase its future
bargaining power, and will result in lower repayments.A related
example would be an increase in international reserve holdings by the
debtor country.Therefore, factors such as the composition of
investment may provide a better signal about prospects for future
repayment.
31Appendix
1.The Effect of the Capital Stock on the Bargaining Outcome
In order to determine the change in the bargaining outcome, we
can assume K parametrically fixed and express equation (16) as:





Itcan be shown that g* >0and fx* <0,so that the sign of
isthe same as the sign of fK*.And the sign of fK* is the











whereC is a positive constant equal to .Recalling
(C+1) (H
thatHi/a>1always, it can be seen thatthe only negative term is
thefirst term in the algebraic sum, but that itis dominated by the





This is immediate from the above result.First note that, for
K*=K,f(X*)can be written asg(h(X*)),with hx* <0.Andsecond,






where C — —--——————————— isa positive constant, and we
[H*(1—H*J/a)(K*a+l)J2






33We will show that the term in brackets is positive, so that the




For the production function to have the standard properties, the
parametermust be constrained to be less than or equal to 1.Note
that for an interior solution to the bargaining problem to exist
is constrained to be .5
<5l/because both countries must be
in a position superior to their threat points.Therefore, when=1,
=.5,and U =0.Because dc2/d <0,as will be shown below, it




The negative sign of follows from
a> 1.To show this,
notice that >1because the debtor has some gains from trade.
Thus, when 0 <a < 1,H >1,and the inequality holds.When a< 0,
<1and <0,so that the inequality also holds.
342.The Effect of a Change in Endowment on the Creditor's Payoff
For the repayment to the creditor to be higher in the
high-endowment state, we need to show thatdX*/d<1,that is, that
the payoff to the debtor country increases less than one for one.
Again, we can express the first order condition as:
(a3)f(X*)=g(X*,)
Inspection of (16) reveals that:
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